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THE WORL0 ECONOMY 
MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
In the first quarter of 1992 GDP/GNP growth averaged 
1.7% in the main four world economies. The position of 
the USA.., Germany and France improved but growth 
slowed dramatically in Japan. Table 1 sets out growth 
rates for each country and provides a provisional estimate 
for the U.SA.. in the second quarter. 
Table 1. Growth of GNP/GDP 
1991q4 1992ql 1992q2 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
-0.5% 
3.1% 
-0.5% 
0.1% 
0.4% 
-1.1% 
2.9% 
1.0% 
1.8% 
1.0% 
0.4% 
-0.5% 
1.4% 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
-0.1% 
Industrial production recovered in the first quarter in 
Germany and in United States. Production has declined 
in France and collapsed in Japan, as can be seen in table 
2. 
Table 2. Growth of Industrial Production 
1991q4 1992ql 1992q2 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
-0.5% 
-1.6% 
0.1% 
1.7% 
-0.7% 
-0.8% 
1.3% 
-4.6% 
1.3% 
1.1% 
-0.3% 
-1.3% 
2.0% 
-6.2% 
1.1% 
0.1% 
n/a 
-0.2% 
Consumer Price inflation remained reasonably stable over 
the three quarters. The major inflationary gains were 
achieved in Japan and Italy. 
Table 3. Consumer Price Inflation 
1991q4 1992ql 1992q2 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
3.0% 
3.2% 
4.5% 
2.9% 
6.1% 
4.2% 
2.9% 
2.1% 
3.3% 
3.1% 
5.6% 
4.1% 
3.1% 
2.5% 
3.5% 
3.1% 
5.5% 
4.2% 
The unemployment position in Italy, France and the 
United Kingdom remains acute, especially in the latter. 
Unemployment has also been rising steadily in the United 
Stats but not the same levels as these European 
economies. 
Table 4. OECD Unemployment Rates 
1991q4 1992ql 1992q2 
United States 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
The United States 
6.9% 
2.1% 
4.3% 
10.0% 
9.9% 
9.7% 
7.1% 
2.0% 
4.3% 
10.1% 
9.9% 
10.2% 
7.4% 
n/a 
n/a 
10.3% 
n/a 
10.5% 
Following the encouraging 2.9% growth of GDP in the 
first quarter the recovery faltered again and achieved a 
rise of only 1.4% in the three months to June. The 
fragility of the U.S. recovery, a symptom of the large 
debt-income ratio fostered in the Reagan years, is 
reflected in the trend of Industrial Production. In March 
and April of this year production growth peaked at 23% 
but has now fallen back to only 0.7% in July. Just like 
the U.K. economy the U.SA. depends on consumer 
confidence to engineer a recovery since the trade deficit 
is well into the red. 
The contribution of the consumer to this uncertainty is 
evident in two indicators; consumers expenditure and 
retail sales volume. The first of these grew by some 5.1% 
in the first quarter and then collapsed in the second, 
showing growth of only 03%. The real volume of retail 
sales has increased very erratically since growth resumed 
in December of last year. It rose by 5.0% in January, 
1.2% in March, 2.1% in April and then fell back again to 
1.4% in May. 
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Two factors which influence consumers confidence, 
which fell back from a nine month peak of 72.6 in June 
to 61.0 in July are the debt-income ratio of consumers 
and their fear of unemployment. The first of these deters 
new credit agreements and the second throws doubt on 
the ability of individuals to use future income as 
collateral, thereby reducing consumption. Evidence 
suggests that the increase in unemployment raises the 
savings ratio, so the faster the rise or more erratic the 
movement in unemployment the less likely a 
consumption increase. 
The OECD standardised unemployment rate rose sharply 
between April and June. It rose by 0.6 to 7.7%, the 
highest rate since 1984. Further weakness in demand can 
be seen in the trend in broad money. M2 growth peaked 
in December 1991 at 3.0% but after the FED cut the 
discount rate to a 29 year low of 3.0% it has failed to 
inflate to anywhere near its target range of 2.5 - 6.5%. 
The composite leading indicator stalled in June after 
growing all year. 
Any room for further cuts in interest rates in the run up 
to the Election is limited because inflation appears to 
have stuck and is threatening to rise again. Consumer 
Prices in July rose by 3.2%, up 0.1% on June, producer 
prices in June rose by 1.7%, up 0.6% on May and unit 
labour costs rose for the first time since January this year. 
On the good side the US Merchandise trade deficit fell 
7.7% in June to $6.6bn as exports rose by 7.2%. 
However more than 40% of the increased exports were 
due to increased sales of civilian aircraft. For the first six 
months the trade deficit was only S5bn worse than the 
$30.5bn deficit for the same period last year. In addition 
the US corporate banking sector seems to have solved its 
problems. After the collapse of the property market the 
US banking sector went into nosedive. It responded 
quickly by slashing dividend payments, rationalising the 
workforce and engineering 3 major mergers. The result of 
these prompt moves is an improvement in earnings, lower 
loan write offs and stronger capital ratios in the second 
quarter. 
Japan 
Fears of a real recession in Japan have resulted from the 
disappointing first quarter GNP growth and the main 
economic indicators released in the summer. Gross 
National Product rose by a mere 1.0% in the first quarter 
buoyed up by consumers expenditure and the ballooning 
current account surplus. Industrial Production fell by 
6.2% in July, more than the average fall in the first six 
months, although nearly twice as bad as the fall in June. 
The state of demand also leaves room for concern. The 
real volume of retail sales fell for the second month 
running in April (-2.8%) but by less than in March (-
4.5%). The trend in volume resembles a downward 
sloping sawtooth and so opens the possibility of further 
contractions, the composite leading indicator, after two 
slight increases in March and April has stalled again. In 
response to the deterioration in the real economy the 
Bank of Japan reduced the discount rate to 3.25% in late 
July, but has failed to boost the money supply as yet 
Broad Money (M2+Cds) rose by 1.1% in May, 0.9% in 
June and a mere 0.2% in July. Narrow money (Ml) grew 
by 6.9%, 33% and 2.8% in the same period 
The labour market has deteriorated again. The OECD 
standardised rate of unemployment rose by 0.1 to 2.1% 
in May. The Vacancy rate indicator fell from 129.8 to 
121.2 in May, representing a fall of 6.6% over the month. 
The problems facing die Japanese economy centre around 
the psychologically damaging effects of the collapse 
share and property prices. Low interest rates in the mid 
1980s, coupled with financial liberalisation led to a 
bubble in asset prices and massive corporate borrowing. 
As the domestic and world economy overheated the cost 
of borrowing increased and asset prices collapsed with 
the obvious inhibitive follow on for investment activity. 
Housing investment, which makes up one fifth of the 
total fell by over 8% in 1991. Unfortunately for the 
authorities, the downward trend in activity has heightened 
the belief that they are ineffective and unlikely to 
engineer a recovery. The stock market crash has certainly 
increased the prospect of an outright real recession. In 
response to the crisis of confidence the authorities have 
introduced a package of fiscal measures which could put 
between Y6,000bn and Y8,000bn into the economy. The 
Bank of Japan has also introduced a series financial 
regulations designed to discourage the selling of shares 
when companies wish to boost profits by realising capital 
gains. 
The Current Account surplus for the half year totalled 
$56.2bn, up 94% on the same period in 1991, a record 
for any half year. The surge in the current account is the 
result of three factors. Firstly, the level of 
competitiveness has improved now that the mid 1980s 
overvaluation of the yen has been reduced. Secondly, the 
large increase in the US export market has boost exports 
and thirdly, very weak domestic demand has reduced 
import demand substantially. 
Inflation does not seem to trouble the Japanese economy 
at this time. Consumer Price inflation fell from 2.5% in 
July to 1.9% in August. Producer prices fell by 0.7% in 
August and have not risen since October 1991. 
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Germany 2.0% in May to a slim 1.1% in July. Unit labour costs 
fell from 5.4% in April to 1.7% in May. 
Real GNP grew by 2.0% in the first quarter of 1992, 
following three successive quarters of contraction. Much 
of the credit for this resurgence stems from a 
resuscitation of investment, which grew by 8%, and 
consumer spending. 
The period since this good news is much less buoyant. 
The real value of retail sales fell heavily in the three 
months to June, showing growth rates of -2.4% in April, 
-4.3% in May and -6.8% in June. This may, of course, be 
due to consumers increasingly putting off non-essential 
purchases until July when the consumption elements of 
the 'Unification taxes' are withdrawn. Assuming that this 
is correct we should see a strengthening in consumers 
expenditure in the latter half of this year, augmented by 
spending brought forward to avoid the raising of VAT 
from 14% to 15%. The trend in industrial production has 
been erratic over the year but contracted heavily in June, 
by 45%, following average positive growth of 0.8% in 
the first five months of 1992. 
The labour market has also deteriorated. In May the 
OECD standardised unemployment rate stood a t 4.5%, 
up from 4.3% in February. The vacancy rate indicator has 
fallen heavily, from 283.5 in February to 266.3 in May, 
a decline of 6.1%. 
The level of the money supply and its effect on interest 
rate movements is of particular concern given Germany's 
anchor role within the ERM. Broad money is currently 
growing at levels well above its 3.5 - 5.5 % annual target 
level. M3 growth has risen throughout the year and 
annual growth rates of 7.8%, 8.2% and 8.4% were 
recorded in May, June and July. The major reason for the 
expansion in credit has been, one, the demand for private 
sector credit, which goes into construction and investment 
in the former East Germany and, two, the demand for 
credit to buy shares in state firms sold by the 
Treuhandanstalt. Interest rate policy has reacted primarily 
to this consideration and in July the Bundesbank raised 
the discount rate by 0.75% although a slight loosening of 
policy occurred in the wake of the ERM crisis. 
Inflation seems to under control now that the unification 
tax has dropped out of the calculations. Consumer prices 
fell from 4.5% in May to 3.3% in July, rising slightly to 
3.5% in August. Producer prices were trimmed from 
The trade deficit is still a problem for Germany. Now 
that the import boom following the unification period is 
over the import pressure has receded. Germany's problem 
is now focused on weak export demand from its 
European competitors, following the high interest rate 
policy followed by the Bundesbank, and from the US 
where German competitiveness has suffered from the 
recent fall in the US dollar. 
The Public Sector deficit, which resulted from large 
social security payments and the 'German Unity Fund' 
which finances public expenditure in the east, is also 
helping to keep interest rates high. Actual outlays in 1991 
were less than expected because of delayed expenditure. 
The implication of this is that we should expect a higher 
than forecast deficit in 1992, possibly resulting in interest 
rates staying high for longer than would have expected. 
ERM and Satellites 
In recent weeks the ERM protagonists have struggled to 
maintain their pre-agreed parities as the Deutschmark 
soared in response to the large interest interest rate 
differential which separates the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the United States. The resulting capital 
flows into the Deutschmark resulted in a strong DM 
appreciation against the rest of the ERM currencies, 
causing consternation among the governments of the 
weaker currencies, i.e. the Italian Lira, the U.K. pound, 
the Spanish Peseta and the Portuguese Escudo, whose 
anti-inflation policies were founded on the discipline of 
ERM credibility. 
In mid September the Bundesbank, undoubtedly in 
reaction to political and economic pressure, lowered short 
rates by a very disappointing 0.25%, but in subsequent 
trading, despite denouncements of any realignment, the 
weaker currencies of the ERM came under what was to 
be insurmountable speculative attack from currency 
dealers anxious to maximise profits. 
In Scandinavia, Finland and Sweden had been trying to 
shadow the Deutschmark in separate experiments with 
ERM discipline. In mid September Finland gave up and 
allowed the Maarka to float, the first effective 
devaluation in the ERM since January 1987. The Swedish 
authorities, worried by the huge flows into the 
Deutschmark, raised overnight rates from 16% to 500% 
in the space of one week to protect the Krona. 
Within the actual ERM, Italy and the U.K. failed to 
maintain their parities. Trading in the Lira, clouded by 
the huge and seemingly irredeemable government 
overspend, first devalued by 1% and when it became 
obvious that this was nothing more than a token withdrew 
entirely. The Bank of England eventually after using 
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intervention, borrowing from the Bundesbank and interest 
rates increases submitted to the inevitable and also 
withdrew from the system. The Spanish Peseta then 
unexpectedly devalued by 5% and the whole system 
verged on extinction. 
The survival of the ERM may depend on the Maastricht 
referendum in France on September 20. France has 
benefitted from ERM membership and obtained low 
inflation but only at the expense of an OECD 
standardised unemployment rate of 10.3% in June 1992. 
At the time of writing, Friday September 18, it appears 
that a Yes vote is the more likely but the overall majority 
and the resulting signal for European unity may be very 
small and possibly insufficient for the move to EMU 
without renegotiation of the Maastricht Treaty. 
World Trade 
Trade rose sharply in the late 1980s as the world 
economy expanded and then fell back to its trend level as 
the slowdown took hold. The contraction in world trade 
has not been as severe as expected for three reasons; the 
reconstruction of Kuwait after the Gulf War, the 
emergence of the Pacific Rim as a industrial force and 
the collapse of inter Eastern bloc trade. Trade within the 
OECD has been more bullish than expected given the 
protracted slowdown. Fortunately for European traders, 
the G7 slowdown has been unsyncronised, the North 
American economies reaching the nadir before their 
Eastern counterparts, and European exporters have been 
able to divert their efforts to the western edge of the 
Atlantic. 
Oil Price 
The current low price of oil, around $17pb, is due to the 
recovery of Middle Eastern supply following last years 
conflagration and unaffected output from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. The invasion of 
Kuwait forced the price near $35pb in October 1990 but 
the price fell when it appeared that the military operation 
would secure the required future supply. 
Prognosis 
The world economy is faced with uncertainty as the long 
term effects of a large debt overhang remain unknown. It 
seems likely that a slow recovery will begin early next 
year as world trade resumes and lower German interest 
rates boost growth in Europe. 
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